This article critically reviews Carroll's book, analyzing its strengths and weaknesses. In writing the critique, I also offer my thoughts on the theme of "history and identity"-most Hong Kong people resist political control from Beijing, while at the same time they embrace China as the motherland. The causes for their current predicament are deeply rooted in history.
The Rise of Chinese Elites to Power and Influence
In chapter 3, "Strategic Balance: Status and Respect in the Colonial Context, " Carroll explores the fissures in British colonial rule that left room for local Chinese elites to cultivate their power and influence. In early Hong Kong, a wide gulf separated the colonial government and its Chinese subjects:
Colonial ignorance, indifference, and incompetence created a demand for services that these merchants were in a special position to offer. Through charitable and voluntary organizations, they resolved civil and commercial disputes, provided medical facilities, and created a voice for the Chinese community. By offering such services, local Chinese merchants were able to take advantage of Hong Kong Carroll's book has many merits, but at this point I would like to suggest how his weak and somewhat careless research in this chapter might have been avoided. As "nationalism and identity" remain critical political issues in Hong Kong today, this is the most important chapter of the book, but it is also the most flawed in its presentation. Is this a fair claim? Have we really misread, overlooked, and oversimplified these large, important issues? If so, our work must be incredibly crude and simplistic.
Actually, when Carroll makes this sweeping claim, he pays insufficient attention to the complexities and nuances of our arguments.
In my own work, I addressed these issues at length: Chinese but also a British subject" (p. 112). I fully accept this statement.
The only difference between Carroll and me up to this point is that he does not fully appreciate the logic and nuance of Morgan's words, an underappreciation leading to inconsistency in his work. How so? Let me try to prove this point.
Selective and Situational Assertions of Identities
It is possible for people to have multiple identities that may or may not be mutu- In other words, a "collaborationist patriot" still retained dual allegiance even when forced to choose a primary allegiance. This situation is subtle and complex.
This argument is closely related to my emphasis on the complex, ambivalent relationship between colonizers and colonized in a colonial situation-harmony and conflict, cooperation and competition, collaboration and confrontation simultaneously, as they were partners and rivals, friends and enemies at the same time. 12 But despite Carroll's admission that "the Hong Kong legend" was "built on both domination and collaboration" (p. 67), he stresses only one side of this complex relationship-namely, friendship, cooperation, and collaboration. This is a major flaw of his work; hence, he is oblivious to the collaborationist patriots' predicament under certain circumstances. 
A Misconception about Sir Kai Ho Kai
Carroll's careless research is further revealed in his frequent reference to Ho Kai as a "financier" (p. 108), "an overseas Chinese capitalist" (p. 109), and "a financier and landlord" (p. 124). In an essay published in 1971, Henry Lethbridge also referred to Ho as a "financier, " who "played the stock exchange with great success and speculated in many fields, particularly land development. " 13 But this was a popular misconcep- a means for them to render assistance to Ho Kai, who, alas, suddenly died of heart failure at the age of fifty-five when the company was barely set up. Sir K'ai has imbibed a certain respect for British institutions and no doubt some loyalty to the British Empire. He is a British subject, having been born in Hongkong, but as his parents were subjects of China, he is in China claimed as a Chinese subject: and I do not think the fact of his having been born in Hongkong would weigh with the Chinese Government in selecting him for service under it. He would, I believe, much like such service. Indeed he has already applied for employment under the Chinese Government and was, I believe, offered a post but was not satisfied with the salary attached to it. The exact number could never be known. But judging from local press reports that seemed more reliable, I conservatively estimate the exodus at over 160,000 people, out of the colony's total population of 720,000. 24 Thin research puts severe restrictions on Carroll's narrative of the responses of the Hong Kong people to the strike-boycott movement. In discussing the counterstrike efforts, he refers to the Labour Protection Bureau, but not the Com-merce Maintenance Bureau (Shangye Weichi Ju) that was set up by the business elites (e.g., Ho Shiguang and Li Youquan) to maintain the colony's trade. 25 Moreover, Carroll relates only some activities of the Chinese bourgeois elites during the strike, and he largely ignores the great majority of Hong Kong's population, including shopkeepers, small traders, hawkers, and also many workers who remained in Hong Kong to continue their work.
Despite these serious limitations, however, Carroll sharply focuses on his major concern: namely, Chinese elites' collaboration with colonial government in a common effort to end the strike-boycott-in order to preserve the colony that they had helped to build.
The 1941 Centenary of Hong Kong as a British Colony
The author then turns in chapter Carroll justly contends that the 1941 centenary was being used by different parts of the Hong Kong population for different purposes. "For government officials and British residents, the centenary was an occasion for self-congratulation"; it also "served as a propaganda campaign to raise money and morale for the British war effort" (pp.
161-162). "For the Chinese community, the centenary was an occasion to highlight its role in the development of both Hong Kong and China, and to drum up support for the war against Japan" (p. 162). By contrasting Hong Kong's development and progress with that of the mainland, the Hong Kong Chinese "highlighted their own uniqueness"; they also sought "to challenge a colonial history that marginalized the contributions of Chinese to Hong Kong's historical development and economic success" (p. 160). 
Chinese Elites in Hong Kong Collaborating with Whoever Happen to Rule It
In December 1941-barely three months after the centenary commemoration-the Japanese invaders forcefully took over Hong Kong. Philip Snow has recently demonstrated that, amid a large exodus to the mainland to flee Japanese rule, the Chinese gentry-merchant elites stayed on to collaborate with the new rulers from outside.
Regarding the elites' sense of identity, Carroll quotes approvingly from Snow's work:
heir loyalty was, in the last resort, to Hong Kong exclusively. For the sake of Hong Kong they would strike an accommodation with whoever happened to rule it.
They were thus, paradoxically, the segment of society on whom the returning British could now [in 1945] best rely" (p. 186). 27 And finally, about current Hong Kong after its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, Carroll succinctly observes: "Just as British colonization was made possible by help from local Chinese, so Chinese recolonization is being made possible by local Hong Kong Chinese" (p. 194).
Carroll has written an interpretive study on a theme that captures my interest from beginning to end. Although his research is rather thin at several points, and his attention largely confined to Chinese elites collaborating with colonizers, he writes with insight and imagination on his main theme. He makes this compelling observation: "In many ways, the secret to Hong Kong's success was China's failure: its inability to provide a secure business environment in the late nineteenth century, its failure to control factionalism and regionalism in the early twentieth century, and its unwillingness to grant merchants any more political power than they might achieve in European colonies.
This made collaboration with Britain an attractive option" (p. 191). And collaboration resulted in building a Hong Kong community to which they owe primary allegiance.
The formation of a sense of "Hong Kong identity" is a process that takes time to centuries. 29 Carroll's book is the latest major work on Hong Kong history to forcefully reaffirm this view. And this is closely related to his assertion that Hong Kong's success story was possible "precisely because it was politically not part of China" (p. 191).
To Resist China's Political Control; To Embrace the Chinese Nation
Indeed, the aversion of the people of Hong Kong to political control from China's corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive officialdom is deeply rooted in history. Even though Carroll makes a gross error in stating that a "[Chinese] consulate was finally opened in 1891" (p. 71), the reasons why Hong Kong has never had a Chinese consulate can be used ironically to strengthen his argument-that Hong
Kong was blessed for not being politically part of China.
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Ever since the subject of consular representation was first raised in 1868, both the colonial government and the Chinese residents had strongly resisted such an arrangement. As Hong Kong was situated right on China's border, Governor R. G. 
